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ABSTRACT The EU’s environmental program and system of funds have been drawn up according to 
different environmental/social needs, thus the economic evaluation of investment circumstances is not 
closely connected to the Hungarian requirements. In many cases it causes unjustified difficulties in 
economic development under colour of pollutant emission which potentially never appears but which 
should be avoided. As a negative sample, it often happens that regional landfills are established to place 
the potentially waste in the future, the waste that would not even be created due to conscious environment 
policy. So it is very important that the quality and quantity of the externalities related to waste management 
should be authentically explored in the fast-developing countries (East-EU-new members). These, mainly 
economic and social analyses, could be the basis of the cornerstones of fundamental regulation of waste 
management and environment application. In this case it is about a significant development stage, since 
this direction determines the future tendencies of both the environmental industry and the resource-
application. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Market failure is said to occur when some cost and or benefits are not fully reflected in market price. The 
market system fails to function property for many kinds of environmental goods because such resources, 
including the service they provide, are often not traded in markets. In general market prices don’t fully 
reflect the value of environmental goods and services. We would like to demonstrate that the waste 
management market failure results in an inefficient allocation of resources and social economic situation. 
Market failure can occur due to of the following mainly: 
• Externalities and  
• Type of market structure. 
An externality is said to exist when the utility of an economic agent is affected by an action of another. 
Generally fallowing factors give rise to externalities, interdependence between economic agents. The 
activity of one agent affects the utility or production function of another. However the market system fails 
to price this interdependence, as a result of which the affected party is uncompensated. Or we can speak 
very often about the externalities if the transaction cost is too high.  The cost of negotiation, implementing 
and enforcing an agreement between the parties may be high (Asafu-Adjaye, 2000). 
 
The high number of market failures and the related external effects have very negative effects on the 
optimalization of cost-structure of waste-management. The fundamental problem of cost/profit approach of 
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waste management is that there are not authentic data about the marginal costs of treated waste. The 
determination of exact external marginal costs depends on the economic environment and the level of its 
contamination. So we can state that even in the same economic area (i.e. the application of the same 
environmental norms) we cannot calculate with the same external marginal costs because the rate of 
return of the waste-management investments may be different based on the different levels of 
contamination. A good example for this may be that in the less-developed regions of the new EU member 
states (10 countries) the waste-management investments cannot be interpreted rationally, since the size 
of optimal regional landfills in accordance with the EU standards is too big for the capacity of the given 
economic and social community, i.e. they do not produce enough waste for the optimal utilization of the 
landfills.  
 
Those EU environmental investments which are not based on economic, but rather on social utility 
generate quite unfavourable and market-deforming effects. A good example for this is if we put the system 
of waste-fees under a cost-structure examination. The waste-management investments carried out not by 
enterprises (e.g. in the case of Hungary) are funded by only the state or the EU. These investments can 
be differentiated by the features and types of available funds. So the structure of the tenders determines 
what kind of waste-management strategy should be carried out in one or another area, should we burn or 
deponate and whether waste-selection strategy should be applied. 
 
The consequence of this development concept which is not quite thought over from economic point of 
view is that the environment quality differences due to different economic development levels are not 
taken into account in the investments, there are not authentic data on waste-management in existence. 
Thus the most important aim of the waste-management investments becomes to be not the meeting of 
environmental requirements, but the gaining and spending of EU funds. Due to the the lack of social and 
economic system of interest waste-management becomes one of the most popular fields of corruption 
processes. 
 
The reason for the inequalities of the source-side of waste-management investments can be well 
demonstrated in Hungary, where there are different systems for the calculation of waste-fees. Different 
companies apply different fees and there could be 3-4 times higher fees in one case for the same type of 
waste than in another. The difference in the system of fees certainly does not depend on the weights of 
environmental externalities, but is based on the „support-content” of the realized management-system.  
 
It is not surprising that the fee of the waste does not contain the external costs related to a given waste, 
but it deforms the market of waste-management and it makes impossible the structuring of the market, so 
the support-content of the investment costs is not presented in the determination of waste-fees. This 
situation results in the underestimation of the system of waste-fees, which generates further overuse of 
resources, and which shows a direction towards the ignoring of the waste-management based on market 
features. 
 
2. TYPE OF EXTERNALITIES IN THE WASTE MANAGEMENT 
 
Pecuniary externality is a form of externality that is transmitted through the price system. An externality is 
an unpriced effect. A pecuniary externality occurs when the externality is transmitted through a higher 
price or reduces costs (Kerekes, 1998). In the waste management we can count with this externality like 
this reduced waste-receiving cost, which cost not include the total cost of investment and external cost of 
environmental pollution.  
 
Figure 1. presents well that the shortage of content of waste fee-system fundamentally modify the creation 
of market related to the treatment of waste and the direction of development processes. On the basis of 
the figure it can be easily understood that current costs, i.e. the cost-structure of (communal mixed) fees of 
waste is underestimated, since it does not calculate either with the external marginal costs, or the real 
costs of investments into the rate of return. 
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Figure 1. Structure of waste charge 
 
The fundamental reason for appearance of the problem is that in practice waste-management investments 
are initiated not on the basis of appropriate cost/profit analyses. The most common calculation forms 
before decision-making are the simple return period, net present value and the internal rate of return, but 
these do not take e.g. the return of support-content into account. The application of investment-return 
indicators mentioned above mean increasing difficulties because of the long-term return of environmental 
investments. 
 
The only one advantage of return-date is that it can be easily calculated. Since it weights equally the 
different inflows or outflows of money, it evaluates equally the present incomes and the incomes of three 
years from now. It does not take into consideration the money-flow after return-period at all. So the 
application of this indicator it is almost impossible to consider the environmental advantages. In the case 
of environmental and waste-management investments it cannot be used even for the first filtration of 
investment alternatives, since it does not form an appropriate basis for long terms.  
 
The biggest defect in the simple return-period is that it does not take into account the money-flows after 
the date of return. Out of two different three-year-long projects one may produce profit for another 10 
years but the other one must be replaced two years after the realization. Though their periods of return 
may be two years in both cases. 
 
3. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
For the calculations of the changing processes, like the operation of waste-management systems, we 
must choose such methods that can help us in determining the value of money and the investment at 
different dates of the projects. With the method of net present value (NPV) we can calculate how much the 
value of investment in money is in the different stages of the project. As calculating the net present value 
we need to use a discount factor which may basically influence the final value of NPV. The amount of the 
discount factor can be increased by some unfavourable factors like the inflationary rate, investment risk 
and the opportunity cost of the capital, thus they can reduce the positive feature of NPV. 
 
5B1-3 
The net present value of an investment consists of the cost of the initial investment and the present value 
of alll the money-flow expected in the future. The decision-situation and the rule of decision-making based 
on NPV is the following (Csutora, 2001): 
• if the NPV is positive, the project must be supported 
• if the NPV is negative, the project must be rejected 
• if the NPV is zero, it does not matter if we realize the project or not, because we do not either gain or 
loose with it 
 
If there are several projects with positive NPV, we need to choose the one with the highest NPV. The 
application of the indicator may be the basis for good decisions in theory, though some problematic issues 
may occur. Due to the application of discount rate, the opportunity cost of capital, e.g. the selection of the 
best alternative, mostly in such countries where there is high inflationary rate, it may move the calculated 
NPV to negative domain in the case of environmental and waste-management investments (Zimler, 2003). 
 
It may often happen that in environmental investments the NPV is negative because of the long period of 
return and because other environmental profits are not taken into account either. This problem can be 
solved by involving EU-sources, thus NPV can become positive. Nevertheless, problems due to support-
policy preferences may cause again difficult situation for decision. Its basis is the different support levels 
related to different strategies and their rational realization. The forced, centralized environmental 
strategies have damaging effects on the creation of waste-markets in most cases and concerning 
investments they do not move the system of waste-management towards optimal system applications 
either (Fogarassy et al. 2004). 
 
Due to this there is a contradiction, presented on Figure 1, saying that the return requirements connected 
to central supports and the environment load related to waste cannot be enforced in the waste-fees. This 
may lead to the deformation, the overplanning and the undercalculation of the waste-management system, 
in which the market elements may become unviable. 
 
The index of return of discounted money-flows may be better aspect to consider than calculating the 
simple return-date, but it hides shortages of methodology due to which waste-management investments 
cannot compete with other investments, though they represent higher values for the society/investor. 
 
However, there are fields of environmental investments, where the calculation of NPV clearly shows us the 
enviromental usefulness of certain factors. The best sample of this may be the field of energy-saving, 
where the explanation for the positive interpretation is the relative high price-level of energy. With the next 
example we would like to show how the NPV calculation (with the application of discount rate) can 
positively influence the realization of such a project which is beneficial from environmental aspects 
opposite to the simple return-date. 
 
The application of energy-saving bulbs is very favourable from environmental point of view. Compact 
bulbs are more long-lasting than the traditional ones and they consume much less energy. Unfortunately 
they cost much more (in this case 12 times more) than the traditional ones. On the basis of NPV is it worth 
to buy these bulbs? Can the cost- and life features form the basis of a cost-effective investment? 
 
According to the given conditions the NPV of the compact bulb is 4410 HUF, i.e. the application of 
compact bulbs for 10 years may result in such a saving at present values. Economic factors and their 
changes may have significant effects on the return of environmental oriented projects (Table 1.). 
 
The determination of discount-rates provides a certain level of subjectivity in the methodology of NPV 
calculation, so to avoid this, the internal rate of return (IRR) is commonly used in practice to calculate the 
return and whose calculation is very similar to the NPV but knowing the precise discount rate in advance is 
not necessary. As the result of the analysis we immediately get to the level of return of the project at 
present value. The internal rate of return is popular and it is commonly used. But unfortunately it has a 
serious defect: in the case of investment processes of several years - like the waste-management 
investments - the sign of yearly money-flows may change several times, so same values can be found for 
IRR in several cases, and we cannot choose the „real value”. 
5B1-4 
 
Table 1. NPV connection with the compact and traditional bulb 
 Compact bulb 
Traditional 
bulb 
Additional  
cash-flow 
Discount 
coefficient 
1/(1+0,15) 
Net 
Present 
Value 
Starting cost 
HUF -600 -50 -550 1 -550 
1. year -260 -1251 991 0,869 862 
2. year -260 -1251 991 0,756 749 
3. year -260 -1251 991 0,657 652 
4. year -260 -1251 991 0,571 567 
5. year -260 -1251 991 0,497 493 
6. year -260 -1251 991 0,432 428 
7. year -260 -1251 991 0,375 373 
8. year -260 -1251 991 0,326 324 
9. year -260 -1251 991 0,284 267 
10. year -260 -1251 991 0,247 245 
NPV     4410 
 
Concerning the return-indicators related to waste-management we can state that theoretically the best 
investment criterium is NPV, because it approaches investment-utility originated from waste-management 
characteristics the best way and in some cases, like in the energy-saving issues, environmental system of 
aspects with appropriate relevance may also be enforced. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
On the basis of the researches carried out, several general consequences can be drawn. Their precise 
determination needs further specific investigations, but they can be considered authentic hypothesis. The 
major statements can be made connected to external marginal cost of waste. There are not exact data 
about the external marginal cost of treated waste, so the waste-management project cannot be assessed 
aothentically from cost-effectiveness point of view. 
 
It can be also stated that price-sensitiveness examinations should be carried out on the cost-effectiveness 
investigations of environmental investments, since in the determination of NPV it can significantly modify 
the final rates of return. It may be especially significant in such case when the support-content of the 
investment may change (if the priorities of environment policy change or if the environment norms become 
more strict) or when the rise of the related external marginal cost curves change. 
 
The practical application of return indicators proves us with no doubt that the usage of resources without 
external cost-content has bad effect on the return indicators and it damages the competitiveness of 
resource-saving investments. The application of high discount rates may also move the indicators of 
environmental investment towards unfavourable direction, so abreast of higher inflationary rates the NPV 
of environmental investments is also unfavourable. In spite of low return rates it can be stated that the 
sectoral application of loans with no interest may improve the real rates of return in the environmental 
investments much more efficiently than the non-refundable supports. The reason for this is that supports 
and the related environmental concepts deform the structure of waste-management. They usually over-
evaluate or under-evaluate the available group of externalities, which paths the way for a bad, irreversible 
development way (mainly in the EU member states). 
 
Abreast of fast economic development the risk level of environmental investments may be quite high, 
since the change of strictness of environmental regulations and of the amount of penalty fees and pollution 
fees may be quite powerful. In the case of investments with marginal returns this may be easily driven in 
both favourable and unfavourable directions, so in this context it is practical to carry out risk assessment 
too. 
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The EU’s environmental program and system of funds have been drawn up according to different 
environmental/social needs, thus the economic evaluation of investment circumstances is not closely 
connected to the Hungarian requirements. In many cases it causes unjustified difficulties in economic 
development under colour of pollutant emission which potentially never appears but which should be 
avoided. As a negative sample, it often happens that regional landfills are established to place the 
potentially waste in the future, the waste that would not even be created due to conscious environment 
policy. 
 
It can be clearly stated that because of the economic recession, due to the change of regime, the 
favourable economic status (indicators of soil-, water- and air pollution) of Eastern-European EU-members 
do not possess real economic values, so the listing up of the external effects of waste-management 
cannot either be convincing. 
 
5. SUMMARY 
 
In the welfare countries (EU 15) dealing with the waste-management fees is much more consistent, since 
the internalization of externalities caused by environmental effects like the cost-system of energy- and 
resource-application or the social/economic activities is carried out at an advanced level. Due to the high 
level of environmental demand of the society it is more or less natural, so it is useful to take the sytem for 
resource application in the most developed countries as a sample. It clearly shows that the usage of 
resources and energy is connected to high fees. The phenomena has strong effect on the differences 
between social groups, because keeping the fees of environmental load and waste low (long-lasting 
under-estimation) increases the social differences. The low fees facilitates only the welfare consumption of 
richer families. 
 
So it is very important that the quality and quantity of the externalities related to waste management 
should be authentically explored in the fast-developing countries (East-EU-new members). These, mainly 
economic and social analyses, could be the basis of the cornerstones of fundamental regulation of waste 
management and environment application. In this case it is about a significant development stage, since 
this direction determines the future tendencies of both the environmental industry and the resource-
application. 
 
6. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
The research was supported by the National Scientific Research Fund (OTKA F42611). 
 
7. REFERENCES 
 
Csutora, M. 2001. Financial analysis of the environmental projects. Ed., BKAE, Budapest, Hungary 
Fogarassy, C. and Boday, A. 2004. Environmental risk analysis model. Ed., Hungarian Scientific Academy 
Social Research Center, Budapest, Hungary 
Asafu-Adjaye, J. 2000. Environmental economics for non-economics. Ed.,World Scientific, Singapore 
Kerekes, S. 1998. Environmental economics. Ed., BKAE, Budapest, Hungary 
Zimler, T. 2003. Waste Management. Ed., Tertia Kiadó, Budapest, Hungary 
5B1-6 
